IDSC Idaho Opening Brief by Strack, Steven W.
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
In re CSRBA (Coeur d'Alene) Hedden-Nicely
2-23-2018
IDSC Idaho Opening Brief
Steven W. Strack
Deputy Attorney General, State of Idaho
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/csrba
This Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Hedden-Nicely at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in In
re CSRBA (Coeur d'Alene) by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
Strack, Steven W., "IDSC Idaho Opening Brief " (2018). In re CSRBA (Coeur d'Alene). 87.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/csrba/87
Docket No. 45381-2017 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
 
 
In Re: The General Adjudication of the Rights to 
the Use of Water from the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River 
Basin Water System;  Case No. 49576, Subcase No. 91-7755 
(353 Consolidated Subcases) 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Objector/Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and  
COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE,  
 
 Claimants/Respondents. 
 
 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls 
Honorable Eric J. Wildman, Presiding 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
DARRELL G. EARLY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
STEVEN W. STRACK, ISB. No. 3906 
Deputy Attorney General 
700 W. State Street – 2nd Floor  
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
steve.strack@ag.idaho.gov 
 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
ERIKA B. KRANZ 
United States Department of Justice Environ
ment & Natural Resources Division Appella  
Section 
P.O. Box 7415 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
Telephone: (202) 307-6105 
erika.kranz@usdoj.gov 
 
Attorneys for United States 
 
 
 
(additional counsel listed inside cover) 
 
Eric Van Orden 
Office of Legal Counsel 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
850 A. Street 
P.O. Box 408 
Plummer, ID 83851 
Telephone: (208) 686-1800 
ervanorden@cdatribe-nsn.gov 
 
Vanessa Ray-Hodge 
SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE, 
MIELKE & BROWNELL, LLP 
500 Marquette Ave. NW Suite 660 
Albuquerque, NM 87106 
Telephone: (505) 247-0147 
vrayhodge@abqsonosky.com  
Attorneys for Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
Albert P. Barker 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
1010 W. Jefferson St., Ste. 102 
P.O. Box 2139 
Boise, ID 83701-2139 
Telephone: (208) 3356-0700 
apb@idahowaters.com 
Attorneys for Hecla Limited 
William J. Schroeder 
KSB LITIGATION, PS  
221 N. Wall, Ste. 210 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Telephone: (509) 624-8988 
william.schroeder@ksblit.legal 
   Attorney for Avista Corporation 
Norman M. Semanko 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone:  (208) 562-4900 
NSemanko@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for members of North Idaho 
Water Rights Alliance, members of the 
Northwest Property Owners Alliance, 
members of the Coeur d’Alene Lakeshore 
Property Owners Associations, Rathdrum 
Power, LLC and Hagadone Hospitality 
Co. 
Nancy A. Wolff 
Mariah. R. Dunham 
MORRIS & WOLFF, P.A. 
722 Main Avenue 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Telephone:  (208) 245-2523 
nwolff@morriswolff.net 
mdunhan@morriswolff.net 
Attorneys for Benewah County, City of 
St. Maries, City of Harrison, Buell Bros., 
Inc., Jack A. Buell and Eleanor L. Buell, 
David Bradley Corkhill and Mary Cork-
hill, and Whiteman Lumber Co., Inc. 
Candice M McHugh  
Chris Bromley 
MCHUGH BROMLEY PLLC  
380 S 4th Street Ste 103  
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-0991 
mchugh@mchughbromley.com  
cbromley@mchughbromley.com 
 
Attorneys for City of Coeur d’Alene  
 
Michael P. Lawrence 
Chris Meyer 
Jeffrey Bower 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock St. 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
mpl@givenspursley.com 
Attorneys for Potlatch Forest Holdings, 
Inc., Potlatch Land & Lumber, LLC, and 
Potlatch TRS Idaho, LLC 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE  ..............................................................................................1 
 A. Nature of the Case  ...................................................................................................1 
 B. Statement of the Facts  .............................................................................................2 
 C. Course of Proceedings  ..........................................................................................11 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL  ....................................................................................13 
III. ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................................14 
 A. Standard of Review  ...............................................................................................14 
 B. Reserved Water Rights Are Implied for a Reservation Only Where the  
Primary Purposes of the Reservation Require the Use of Water and  
Such Purposes Are “Directly Associated” with the Reservation of Land  ............16 
 C. The District Court Failed to Consider Whether the Congressional Acts 
Approving the 1887 and 1889 Agreements Superseded the Purposes of  
the 1873 Executive Order  .....................................................................................18 
 D. Instream Flows Cannot be Awarded on Waterways Within those Portions 
of the Reservation No Longer Reserved for the Tribe’s Exclusive Use  
and Benefit  ............................................................................................................24 
IV. CONCLUSION  ................................................................................................................43 
 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 
849 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2017)  ................................................................................17, 18 
Arenas v. United States, 322 U.S. 419 (1944)  ..................................................................27 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)  ................................................................18, 19 
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 (1920)  .....................................................28 
Black Canyon Irrig. Dist. v. State of Idaho, ____ Idaho ___, 408 P.3d 899 (2018)  .........14 
Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981)  .......................................................... passim 
Bonanno v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 769 (1987)  .............................................................15 
Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 (2010)  .....................................................14 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,  
492 U.S. 408 (1989)  ............................................................................................. passim 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page ii 
 
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936)  .........20 
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)  .............................................................17 
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976)  ...............................................................15 
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943)  ...................................................16 
Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States,  
391 F.2d 614 (Ct. Cl. 1967)  .........................................................................................15 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 547 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981)  ..................... passim 
Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968)  ........................30 
Hartman v. Butterfield Lumber Co., 199 U.S. 335 (1905)  ...............................................29 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987)  ...............................................................................27 
Hoffer v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 47 P.3d 1261 (2002)  .................................................14 
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001)  ............................................................ passim 
In re the Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 1 (1821)  ...................................................16 
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn 
River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1998)  .........................................................18, 23, 24 
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)  .................................................................................16 
Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979)  ..........................................................37 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)  .................................................................29 
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)  .........................24, 26 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999)  .....................15 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906 (Ct. Cl. 1963)  ......................26 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)  ....................................................... passim 
Montana Power v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942) .............................................26 
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 194 L. Ed. 2d 152 (2016)  ......................................27 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)  .............................................................................33 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008)  .......34 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977)  ...... passim 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)  ...............................................16, 17 
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942)  .........................................21 
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) .........................................................................9, 27 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993)  ........................................................28, 35 
State v. Cutler, 109 Idaho 448, 708 P.2d 853 (1985) ........................................................42 
State v. Lott, 21 Idaho 646, 123 P. 491 (1912)  .................................................................29 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page iii 
 
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983)  ............................................. passim 
United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984)  ...................................... passim 
United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982)  ........................................41 
United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494 (1900)  ...................................................16 
United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 988 P.2d 1199 (1999) .....................17, 26 
United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Idaho 1998)  ............................................3 
United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000)  .............................................6, 7, 21 
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978)  .........................................................17 
United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939) ..................................................................28 
United States v. Reynolds, 250 U.S. 104 (1919)  ..............................................................10 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)  ...........................................................34, 35 
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507 (1925)  ...............................................................................42 
Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961)  .................................................26 
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)  ......................................................... passim 
Statutes and Regulations 
U.S. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2  .....................................................................................................16 
U.S. Const. Amend. 10  .....................................................................................................16 
Act of May 15, 1886, 24 Stat. 29  ......................................................................................21 
Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980  ...............................................................................7, 21 
Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989  ...................................................................7, 22, 24, 27 
Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286  .....................................................................................8 
Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325  ............................................................................ passim 
Act of May 19, 1958, 72 Stat. 121  ....................................................................................10 
Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649 (1868)  .........................................................................31 
General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388  .................................................9, 27, 34 
Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 392  .................................................................30 
25 U.S.C. § 348  .......................................................................................................9, 10, 27 
25 U.S.C. § 564m  ..............................................................................................................38 
Executive Order of Nov. 8, 1873  .............................................................................. passim 
Executive Order of Jan. 18, 1881 ......................................................................................41 
1 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 925 (1904)  ...............................41 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 1 
 
I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
When the United States reserves land for the exclusive use and occupation of an Indian 
tribe, it impliedly reserves the use of appurtenant waters if the reserved lands “would be value-
less” otherwise.  Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).   
Below, the district court held that one of the primary purposes of the reservation set apart 
by Executive Order on November 8, 1873 (R. 2031) was to provide hunting and fishing for the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  Such purpose was implied by the drawing of reservation boundaries to in-
clude waterways that the Tribe insisted were needed for “a while yet” while the Tribe transi-
tioned to a farming lifestyle.  R. 4313 (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 266 
(2001)).  The district court then assumed, without explanation or discussion, that the Reservation 
continues to be held for such a purpose despite an 1891 Act that excluded most of those same 
waterways from the Reservation while protecting the Tribe’s agricultural lands, and a 1906 Act 
that placed tribal members on individual farms, eliminated almost all tribal communal land hold-
ings, and opened the Reservation to non-Indian settlement.  Over 75% of Reservation lands were 
eventually sold in fee simple to non-Indians, including the lands underlying and encompassing 
many of the streams for which the district court awarded the United States water rights to main-
tain fish habitat.   
This appeal turns on the question of whether the United States can claim reserved water 
rights for fish and wildlife habitat when a reservation, established to meet a tribe’s hunting and 
fishing needs “for a while yet,” is later reconfigured by Congress for the primary purpose of 
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meeting the Tribe’s agricultural needs, and is further reconfigured by allotting each member an 
individually-owned farm, and selling the remainder of the reservation to non-Indian homestead-
ers.  The sale of the majority of reservation lands to non-Indians is particularly relevant because 
reserved water rights are appurtenant to reserved land.  When land within an Indian reservation 
ceases to be held by the United States for a tribe’s exclusive use, consumptive reserved water 
rights are either conveyed to the new land owner or are extinguished.  Colville Confederated 
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 50 (9th Cir. 1981) United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 
1363 (9th Cir. 1984).  Whether conveyed or extinguished, the United States cannot claim re-
served water rights for consumptive uses on lands conveyed to non-Indians.  The State asserts 
that the same principle applies with equal force to non-consumptive water rights for fish and 
wildlife habitat.  The district court, however, failed to squarely address this issue.  This appeal 
requires this Court to determine: (1) the impact of superseding legislation on the Reservation’s 
purposes; and (2) whether the United States can claim ownership of water rights implied by the 
reservation of land for the Tribe’s exclusive use when the United States no longer holds title to 
the lands for the benefit of the Tribe.    
B. Statement of the Facts 
The district court adopted the findings of fact from Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 
(2001), which addressed the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s ownership of submerged lands underlying 
the Reservation’s navigable waterways, primarily the southern third of Coeur d’Alene Lake and 
the lower reach of the St. Joe River.  The findings of fact, as adopted by the district court, start as 
follows: 
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The Coeur d'Alene Tribe once inhabited more than 3.5 million acres in what is 
now northern Idaho and northeastern Washington, including the area of Lake 
Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River.  Tribal members traditionally used the lake 
and its related waterways for food, fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural 
activities. Id., at 1099-1102. The Tribe depended on submerged lands for every-
thing from water potatoes harvested from the lake to fish weirs and traps anchored 
in riverbeds and banks.   
Under an 1846 treaty with Great Britain, the United States acquired title to the re-
gion of Lake Coeur d'Alene . . . .  In 1867, in the face of immigration into the 
Tribe's aboriginal territory, President Johnson issued an Executive Order setting 
aside a reservation of comparatively modest size, although the Tribe was appar-
ently unaware of this action until at least 1871, when it petitioned the Government 
to set aside a reservation . . . .  The Tribe found the 1867 boundaries unsatisfac-
tory, due in part to their failure to make adequate provision for fishing and other 
uses of important waterways. When the Tribe petitioned the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs a second time, it insisted on a reservation that included key river val-
leys because “we are not as yet quite up to living on farming” and “for a while yet 
we need have some hunting and fishing.”  
R. 4313 (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 265-66).  The above-referenced petition 
from the Tribe was striking in its insistence that hunting and fishing was a necessary stopgap 
(i.e., needed “for a while yet”) while the Tribe progressed in its adoption of agriculture:   
[W]e are not as yet quite up to living on farming: with the work of God we took 
labor too, we began tilling the ground and we like it: though perhaps slowly we 
are continually progressing; but our aided industry is not as yet up to the white 
man's. We think it hard to leave at once old habits to embrace new ones: for a 
while yet we need have some hunting and fishing. 
United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103 (D. Idaho 1998) (quoting petition).  The peti-
tion helped spur negotiations with the Tribe:  
Following further negotiations, the Tribe in 1873 agreed to relinquish (for com-
pensation) all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substan-
tial reservation that negotiators for the United States agreed to “set apart and se-
cure” “for the exclusive use of the Coeur d'Alene Indians, and to protect ... from 
settlement or occupancy by other persons.”  The reservation boundaries described 
in the agreement covered part of the St. Joe River (then called the St. Joseph), and 
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all of Lake Coeur d'Alene except a sliver cut off by the northern boundary. 
Although by its own terms the agreement was not binding without congressional 
approval, later in 1873 President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that 
the reservation specified in the agreement be “withdrawn from sale and set apart 
as a reservation for the Coeur d'Alene Indians.”  The 1873 Executive Order set the 
northern boundary of the reservation directly across Lake Coeur d'Alene, which, 
the District Court found, was contrary “to the usual practice of meandering a sur-
vey line along the mean high water mark.”   
R. 4313-14 (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 266).  The executive order was “seen as 
a temporary measure to fully protect the agreement until the necessary legislation could be 
passed [and] Congress confirmed the reservation.”  R. 1593 (affidavit of Tribe expert E. Richard 
Hart).  The agreement, however, was not ratified, and the commission that negotiated it repudi-
ated it and questioned whether they ever had authority to negotiate the Agreement.  R. 2989-90 
(affidavit of State expert Stephen Wee).  Then: 
An 1883 Government survey fixed the reservation's total area at 598,499.85 acres, 
which the District Court found necessarily “included submerged lands within the 
reservation boundaries.”  
As of 1885, Congress had neither ratified the 1873 agreement nor compensated 
the Tribe. This inaction prompted the Tribe to petition the Government again, to 
“make with us a proper treaty of peace and friendship ... by which your petitioners 
may be properly and fully compensated for such portion of their lands not now 
reserved to them; [and] that their present reserve may be confirmed to them.”  In 
response, Congress authorized new negotiations to obtain the Tribe's agreement to 
cede land outside the borders of the 1873 reservation.  In 1887, the Tribe agreed 
to cede 
 “all right, title, and claim which they now have, or ever had, to all lands in 
said Territories [Washington, Idaho, and Montana] and elsewhere, except the 
portion of land within the boundaries of their present reservation in the Terri-
tory of Idaho, known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation.”  
The Government, in return, promised to compensate the Tribe, and agreed that 
 “[i]n consideration of the foregoing cession and agreements ... the Coeur 
d'Alene Reservation shall be held forever as Indian land and as homes for the 
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Coeur d'Alene Indians ... and no part of said reservation shall ever be sold, oc-
cupied, open to white settlement, or otherwise disposed of without the consent 
of the Indians residing on said reservation.”  
As before, the agreement was not binding on either party until ratified by Con-
gress.   
In January 1888, not having as yet ratified any agreement with the Tribe, the Sen-
ate expressed uncertainty about the extent of the Tribe's reservation and adopted a 
resolution directing the Secretary of the Interior to “inform the Senate as to the 
extent of the present area and boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation 
in the Territory of Idaho,” and specifically, “whether such area includes any por-
tion, and if so, about how much of the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene, 
and of Coeur d'Alene and St. Joseph Rivers.”  The Secretary responded in Febru-
ary 1888 with a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, stating that “the 
reservation appears to embrace all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene, 
except a very small fragment cut off by the north boundary of the reservation,” 
and that “[t]he St. Joseph River also flows through the reservation.”   
R. 4314 (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 268).   
In the 1888 resolution, Congress asked the Secretary of the Interior whether a portion of 
the reservation should be opened to settlement and “whether it is advisable to release any of the 
navigable waters aforesaid from the limit of such reservation.”  R. 2059 (Sen. Ex. Doc 76).  In 
response, the Secretary forwarded a report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs noting that 
the Tribe was “far advanced,” “cultivate[d] the soil extensively” and advising “that changes 
could be made in the boundaries for the release of some or all of the navigable waters therefrom, 
which would be of great benefit to the public.”  R. 2061-62.  The Secretary’s report prompted 
Congress to seek additional cessions from the Tribe before acting to ratify the 1887 Agreement: 
Congress was not prepared to ratify the 1887 agreement, however, owing to a 
growing desire to obtain for the public not only any interest of the Tribe in land 
outside the 1873 reservation, but certain portions of the reservation itself. The 
House Committee on Indian Affairs later recalled that the 1887 agreement was 
not promptly ratified for 
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 “sundry reasons, among which was a desire on the part of the United States to 
acquire an additional area, to wit, a certain valuable portion of the reservation 
specially dedicated to the exclusive use of said Indians under an Executive or-
der of 1873, and which portions of said lands, situate[d] on the northern end of 
said reservation, is valuable and necessary to the citizens of the United States 
for sundry reasons. It contains numerous, extensive, and valuable mineral 
ledges. It contains large bodies of valuable timber.... It contains a magnificent 
sheet of water, the Coeur d'Alene Lake....”  
But Congress did not simply alter the 1873 boundaries unilaterally. Instead, the 
Tribe was understood to be entitled beneficially to the reservation as then defined, 
and the 1889 Indian Appropriations Act included a provision directing the Secre-
tary of the Interior “to negotiate with the Coeur d'Alene tribe of Indians,” and, 
specifically, to negotiate “for the purchase and release by said tribe of such por-
tions of its reservation not agricultural and valuable chiefly for minerals and tim-
ber as such tribe shall consent to sell.”   
R. 4314-15 (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 269).  “[T]he main purpose of the 
new [1889] negotiations was to regain from the Tribe whatever submerged lands it was willing 
to sell.”  United States v. Idaho, 210 F. 3d 1067, 1077 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000).  The result, in subse-
quent negotiations, was the drawing of new Reservation boundaries that excluded from the Res-
ervation two-thirds of Coeur d’Alene Lake. 
Later that year, the Tribe and Government negotiators reached a new agreement 
under which the Tribe would cede the northern portion of the reservation, includ-
ing approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d'Alene, in exchange for $500,000.  
The new boundary line, like the old one, ran across the lake, and General Simp-
son, a negotiator for the United States, reassured the Tribe that “you still have the 
St. Joseph River and the lower part of the lake.”  And, again, the agreement was 
not to be binding on either party until both it and the 1887 agreement were ratified 
by Congress.  
…. 
On March 3, 1891, Congress “accepted, ratified, and confirmed” both the 1887 
and 1889 agreements with the Tribe. 
R. 4315 (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 269-70).  
The Supreme Court’s findings of fact in Idaho v. United States, as adopted by the district 
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court, only address the purpose of the 1873 Executive Order, and do not address whether Con-
gress, in establishing new Reservation boundaries in Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989 (“1891 
Act”), adopted the Executive Order’s purpose or intended to encourage new purposes and uses of 
Reservation lands to meet the Tribe’s future needs.  The federal courts concluded that it was not 
necessary to determine “the purpose of the reservation as understood by Congress (rather than 
the Executive), and as so understood in 1889 (rather than 1873),” because the issue before the 
court “did not require either that Congress itself apprehend the purpose [of the Executive Order] 
or that the purpose be extant at the time of congressional action.”  United States v. Idaho, 210 
F.3d at 1075-76.  Because ownership of submerged lands turned solely on “Congress's awareness 
that the 1873 reservation included submerged lands,” the federal courts concluded that for pur-
poses of determining such ownership “it is irrelevant that Congress may have believed the Tribe 
to have wholly or mainly converted to an agricultural lifestyle by 1889.”  Id. at 1076. 
The district court, like the federal courts, it did not address whether Congress established 
new purposes for the diminished Reservation by encouraging only the Tribe’s agricultural ef-
forts.  The 1891 Act substantially reduced the Reservation by removing the northern two-thirds 
of Coeur d’Alene Lake, emphasizing the retention of agricultural lands (the authorizing legisla-
tion provided that any lands ceded should be “not agricultural”), Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 
980, 1002, and repeatedly averring its intent to promote “the progress, comfort, improvement, 
education, and civilization of said Coeur d’Alene Indians.”  1891 Act, 26 Stat. at 1028, 1031.   
The Act’s focus on “civilized” purposes reflected the Tribe’s by-then renowned agricul-
tural successes.  The Tribe’s statement in its 1872 petition that it would be “up to living on  
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farming” after a “while yet” had proven prophetic: by the time of the 1889 negotiations to alter 
the Reservation boundaries, the Tribe had thousands of acres under cultivation, R. 0719 (affida-
vit of U.S. expert Ian Smith), was harvesting tens of thousands of bushels of wheat and oats, R. 
2087, 2095, and was hiring white workers to help work their farms.  R. 3377. 1  The parties to the 
1887 and 1889 negotiations emphasized the Tribe’s agricultural pursuits by mentioning them at 
least 17 times.  R. 2113-19; 2153-58 (negotiation transcripts).  Tribal members (along with many 
non-Indians) continued to hunt and fish within the boundaries of the reduced Reservation.  R. 
2671-72; 3387-88.  The sole mention of hunting or fishing during negotiations, however, was in 
the past tense: Commissioner Daniels stated that “[w]hen first I went among the Indians they had 
as food the wild meat of the buffalo; now I see you on good farms and in your happy homes.”  R. 
2154.  Notably, Chief Seltice, when describing what the Tribe wanted “preserved forever,” listed 
“our homes . . . our houses [and] our farms”, R., 2157, but made no mention of hunting or fish-
ing.  Seltice aptly demonstrated the Tribe’s reliance on farming by pleading with the commis-
sioners to wrap up the 1889 negotiations “because we are under expense and busy with our 
crops.”  R. 2116.   
After the new Reservation boundaries were ratified in 1891, the Reservation remained 
intact for a number of years, with the exception of a minor cession of lands for the Harrison 
townsite, described by a tribal member as “the place where the Indians used to fish.”  R. 0741, 
2202.  See Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 386, 322 (confirming cession).   
                                                 
1  To put these figures into context, the 40,000 bushels of wheat harvested by the 500 member 
Tribe in 1887, R. 2095, would yield 3,600,000 one-pound loaves of bread.  R. 2525. 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 9 
 
The year 1906 saw major changes to the Reservation.  Congress, over the objections of 
the Tribe, ordered that each member of the Tribe be given an “allotment” of 160 acres.  Act of 
June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 335.  Allotted lands ceased to be held for the benefit of the Tribe, 
but instead were held in trust by the United States “for the sole use and benefit” of the allottee.  
General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 348).  The allot-
ment policy implemented Congress’ “view that the Indian tribes should abandon their nomadic 
lives on the communal reservations and settle into an agrarian economy on privately-owned par-
cels of land.”  Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984).  Of the approximately 345,000 acres 
within the Reservation, 104,076 acres were allotted to the members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
and members of the Spokane Tribe.  R. 2244-45.  The Secretary of the Interior was “authorized 
and directed . . . to sell or dispose of unallotted lands” in the Reservation by opening such “sur-
plus lands . . . to settlement and entry under the provisions of the homestead laws.”  34 Stat. at 
336.  Surplus lands were sold to homesteaders “at not less than their appraised value,” id., and 
the proceeds were deposited in the U.S. Treasury to the credit of the Tribe.  Id. at 337. 
Lands allotted to tribal members were concentrated in the agricultural lands in the west-
ern portion of the Reservation.  R. 2214 (map).  Almost all the lands in the stream basins drain-
ing into Coeur d’Alene Lake were made available for sale to non-Indian purchasers.  Id.  The 
conveyance of lands to homesteaders was complete and unqualified: the 1906 Act did not pur-
port to reserve any property rights on behalf of tribal members allowing entry upon or use of the 
now-private lands.   
The General Allotment Act allowed tribal allottees, after a holding period, to acquire fee 
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simple patents to their allotments.  25 U.S.C. § 348.  Once a fee patent was issued, the allotment 
was no longer federal land: “the United States surrendered its trust by conveying the fee simple 
title to the Indian allottee or his heirs.”  United States v. Reynolds, 250 U.S. 104, 108 (1919).  
Fee title was alienable, and a substantial number of allotments were conveyed to non-Indians: by 
1933 the total acreage of allotments held by Coeur d’Alene tribal members was reduced to 
62,400 acres.  R. 2250-51.  In 1958 12,878 acres that were made available for purchase under the 
1906 Act but never sold were restored to tribal ownership.  Act of May 19, 1958, 72 Stat. 121.  
Since 1958, the Tribe has reacquired other lands within the Reservation—some of those lands 
have been taken into trust by the United States, and some remain held in fee by the Tribe.  R. 
3501-03; see also map accompanying Protective Order, R. 3692 (filed under seal) (showing re-
acquired lands not taken into trust as “tribally owned fee” lands). 
The result of the various conveyances of land within the Reservation was the creation of 
a classic “checkerboard” reservation, with federal and tribal land holdings representing only a 
fraction of lands within the reservation.  This is reflected in the United States’ water right claims 
for irrigation, domestic use, and wildlife habitat (springs, seeps, and wetlands), which are all lim-
ited to lands within the Reservation either held in trust for the Tribe, held in trust for tribal mem-
bers, or owned in fee by the Tribe.  R. 0009, 0011.  The United States’ claims for instream flows, 
however, claim the right to maintain stream levels in Reservation streams regardless of whether 
the United States or the Tribe holds title to the streambed and/or adjacent lands.   
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 11 
 
C. Course of Proceedings 
On January 13, 2014, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, acting as trustee for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, filed 353 claims for reserved water rights.  
Forty-four claims were made for irrigation of 5,573 acres.  R. 0006, 0010.  Seventeen claims 
were made for domestic, commercial, municipal and industrial (DCMI) uses.  R. 0005, 0009-10.  
Twenty-four claims were made for springs and seeps, and 195 claims were made for mainte-
nance of wetlands.  R. 0006-07, 0011-12.  Claims for springs, seeps, and wetlands were sought 
for purpose of providing game and waterfowl habitat, plant gathering, and traditional, cultural, 
spiritual, ceremonial, and/or religious uses.  R. 0011.  A single claim for maintenance of water 
levels in Coeur d’Alene Lake was made for purposes of providing food, fiber, transportation, 
recreation, religious, cultural and ceremonial uses, fish and wildlife habitat, wetland mainte-
nance, water storage, power generation, and aesthetics.  R. 0011.  Seventy-two claims sought in-
stream flows to provide fish habitat.  R. 0010.  Of the 72 instream flow claims, 57 were for 
stream reaches wholly outside the boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation; 8 additional 
claims straddle the boundary.  R. 4481.  All claims were adopted by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  R. 
0004.  
The district court consolidated the 353 claims into subcase no. 91-7755, and bifurcated 
adjudication of the claims into entitlement and quantification phases.  R. 0463.  The entitlement 
phase proceeded to summary judgment, in which the court, citing only the purposes of the 1873 
Executive Order, held that the primary purposes of the Reservation were “to promote an agrarian 
lifestyle for its inhabitants” and “to provide the Tribe with waterways for hunting and fishing.”  
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 12 
 
R. 4320-21.  Accordingly, the district court concluded that “claims for purposes of uses other 
than agriculture, fishing and hunting, and domestic use must be disallowed as a matter of law.”  
R. 4324.  The court thus disallowed the claim for lake level maintenance, since “[l]ake level 
maintenance was not a primary purpose of the reservation,” R. 4328, but allowed the claim to 
proceed to quantification based “on its ‘fish and wildlife’ purpose of use.”  R. 4302.  Likewise, 
the court allowed claims for springs, seeps, and wetlands to proceed to quantification, but limited 
the purpose of use to “wildlife and plant habitat for hunting.”  R. 4302.  
In its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, the district court held that the United 
States was not entitled to water rights for instream flows outside the boundaries of the Reserva-
tion.  R. 4324-25.  The court’s Final Order Disallowing Water Rights Claims, however, disal-
lowed all 72 instream flow claims, both inside and outside the Reservation, prompting the United 
States and the Tribe to file a motion to correct what they asserted to be a clerical error.  R. 4346.  
The court ultimately agreed and reinstated 7 instream flow claims wholly within the Reservation 
and the on-Reservation portions of another 8 claims whose stream reaches straddle the Reserva-
tion boundaries.  R. 4468, 4481.  Another motion filed by the United States and Tribe that sought 
to reinstate “gathering” as a primary purpose of the Reservation was denied by the court.  R. 
4356, 4480.  
In conjunction with its determination of the primary purposes of the Reservation, the dis-
trict court determined the applicable priority date of the reserved water rights: “1873” for irriga-
tion and domestic water rights; “time immemorial” for hunting and fishing water rights; and the 
”date of reacquisition” for “water rights associated with reservation lands homesteaded by non-
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Indians and later reacquired by the Tribe,” or, if applicable, “the date the homesteader perfected 
a water right on the homesteaded lands under state law.”  R. 4326-27.  In response to a motion to 
reconsider filed by the State (R. 4343), the court clarified that the “date of reacquisition” priority 
date applied not only to homesteaded lands, but also to allotted lands that were conveyed to non-
Indians and later reacquired by the Tribe.  R. 4474.  It also held that because non-Indian land 
owners could not “appropriate or exercise non-diversionary or instream rights, except for stock-
water . . . [s]prings and wetlands as well as other rights lost to non-use would carry a date of re-
acquisition priority date.”  R. 4474.   
Following the district court’s entry of its Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Or-
der on Motion to Set Aside and Modify (R. 4473, 4479), a notice of appeal was timely filed by 
the State.  The State additionally filed a motion for permissive appeal of the summary judgment 
order, which was denied by this Court with the notation that “interlocutory orders may be ad-
dressed on appeal.”  Order Denying State of Idaho’s Motion Requesting Acceptance of Appeal by 
Permission, Dkt. No. 45321-2017 (Sept. 27, 2017).  Notices of appeal were also filed by the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the United States, and the North Idaho Water Rights Group.   
II.  ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in limiting its determination of the Reservation’s 
purposes to the 1873 Executive Order, without considering whether the purposes of the congres-
sional act establishing a diminished reservation in 1891, that encouraged only farming, super-
seded the purposes of the 1873 Executive Order Reservation? 
2.  Whether reserved instream flow water rights to preserve fish habitat survive in those 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 14 
 
Reservation stream basins where the Tribe’s title to the lands underlying and surrounding the 
subject stream has since been largely or entirely extinguished by conveyance of the lands in fee 
simple to non-Indians? 
3. Did the district court err in reinstating all instream flow claims within the bounda-
ries of the Reservation, given its concurrent holding that reserved water rights for “instream pur-
poses” are lost through non-use when reservation lands are acquired by non-Indians? 
III.  ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The standard of review for appeals from summary judgment orders is well established:   
This Court has explained that, when it reviews a summary judgment on appeal, “it 
does so under the same standards employed by the district court. ‘The fact that the 
parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the appli-
cable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate each party’s motion on its 
own merits.’  Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law.’  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Where the case will be tried without a 
jury, ‘the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable in-
ferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the sum-
mary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences.’ This Court freely 
reviews the entire record that was before the district court to determine whether 
either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and whether inferences 
drawn by the district court are reasonably supported by the record.” 
Black Canyon Irrig. Dist. v. State of Idaho, ___ Idaho ___, 408 P.3d 899, 904-05 (2018), quoting 
Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176–77, 233 P.3d 102, 107–08 (2010) (citations omitted in origi-
nal). 
“As to issues of law, this Court exercises free review of the trial court's decision.”  Hoffer 
v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 294, 47 P.3d 1261, 1264 (2002).  Here, the primary question is one 
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of governmental intent: “[i]n determining whether there is a federally reserved water right im-
plicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to re-
serve unappropriated and thus available water.  Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated 
waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created.”   
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976).   
Where rights are asserted to be implicit in a treaty’s terms, “review of the history and the 
negotiations of the agreements is central to the interpretation of treaties.”  Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).  “[A]ppropriate landmarks are, inter 
alia, the instructions to the treaty commissioners, their report to their superior, the treaty pream-
ble, the President's message transmitting the treaty to Congress and the subsequent treatment 
given to the terms of the treaty by the United States and the Indians.”  Citizens Band of Pota-
watomi Indians v. United States, 391 F.2d 614, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1967).  Examination of such records 
allows the court to consider “the context of the treaty negotiations to discern what the parties in-
tended by their choice of words.”  Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 202.  Ex-
amination of a treaty’s negotiating history, however, does not render its interpretation a matter of 
fact.  Bonanno v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 769, 772 (1987).  Questions of intent are legal issues: 
where a government act incorporates or ratifies a treaty or agreement with an Indian tribe, “the 
interpretation of [the] treaty is a question of law and not a matter of fact.”  Citizens Band of Pota-
watomi Indians, 391 F.2d at 618.  
In determining intent, ambiguities in agreements with Indian tribes are “construed, not 
according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they 
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would naturally be understood by the Indians.”  Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).  This is 
so because of the unequal bargaining position of the parties and because tribal representatives, 
often working through interpreters, were likely “unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expres-
sion” employed in drafting the agreement.  Id.   
But such canons of construction are limited: “Indian treaties cannot be rewritten or ex-
panded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted under-
standing of the parties.”  Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).  Nor can 
the Court employ any “notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial justice,” to “incor-
porate into an Indian treaty something that was inconsistent with the clear import of its words.”  
United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532 (1900).  In short, the court cannot:  
supply a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law.  We are to find the in-
tention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject-matter; 
and, having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes and to stop where 
that stops--whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves be-
hind . . . . 
Id. at 533 (quoting In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 1, 71-72 (1821)).   
B. Reserved Water Rights Are Implied for a Reservation Only Where the Primary 
Purposes of the Reservation Require the Use of Water and Such Purposes Are “Di-
rectly Associated” with the Reservation of Land.  
One of the basic tenets of the United States Constitution is that police powers, including 
the power to regulate the use and exploitation of water resources, are reserved to the several 
States.  U.S. Const. amend. 10.  Although federal law can limit the States’ sovereign authority, 
U.S. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2, stringent preemption standards apply to Congressional action when it 
legislates “in a field which States have traditionally occupied.”  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
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331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  Nowhere is this truer than in the field of water law: the Supreme 
Court has often remarked upon “the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to 
state water law by Congress.”  California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).  Departures 
from Congress’ policy of purposeful deference to state water law may be implied from the with-
drawal of land from the public domain for “specific federal purposes,” but only if “necessary to 
fulfill the very purposes” for which the land was withdrawn.  United States v. New Mexico, 438 
U.S. 696, 702 (1978).  The limits of the doctrine have been recognized by this and other courts:   
Reserved water rights may be either express or implied.  Where Congress does 
not expressly reserve water rights, an intent to reserve unappropriated water is in-
ferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the 
purposes for which the reservation was created.  The necessity of water must be 
so great that without the water the reservation would be entirely defeated.  How-
ever, if water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, the United 
States is left to “acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private 
appropriator.”  
United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 529, 988 P.2d 1199, 1203 (1999) (inter-
nal citations omitted).  The primary issue to be determined in a reserved water rights case is the 
purpose of the federal reservation.  “Water is impliedly reserved for primary purposes.  It is not, 
however, reserved for secondary purposes.”  Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701).  There are two parts to the primary purpose test: the court “must deter-
mine the primary purpose of the Tribe’s reservation and whether that purpose contemplates wa-
ter use.”  Id. at 1270.   
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The primary purposes of a reservation are those uses of reserved land actively encour-
aged, rather than merely permitted, by the agreement, act, or order establishing the reservation.  
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 
P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1998); see also Agua Caliente Band, 849 F.3d at 1265 (basing primary pur-
pose of reservation on government reports citing need “to encourage tribal members ‘to build 
comfortable houses, improve their acres, and surround themselves with home comforts’”) (quot-
ing Comm’r of Indian Aff. Ann. Rep. 224 (1875)). 
Water is reserved for primary purposes only if such purposes are “directly associated 
with the reservation of land.”  Agua Caliente Band, 849 F.3d at 1270.  Reservations of land may 
occur by treaty, statute, or executive order.  Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963). 
C. The District Court Failed to Consider Whether the Congressional Act Approving 
the 1887 and 1889 Agreements Superseded the Purposes of the 1873 Executive Or-
der.   
1.  The primary purposes of land withdrawn by executive order, and the rights implied 
therefrom, do not automatically carry over when a subsequent, congressionally-ratified agree-
ment establishes new purposes for a reservation, particularly where the executive order set aside 
lands to meet a tribe’s immediate subsistence needs and the subsequent congressional action ad-
dresses the tribe’s permanent needs.  This principle is demonstrated by the seminal reserved wa-
ter rights case, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), which addressed water rights for 
the Fort Belknap Reservation.  The Fort Belknap Reservation was created by a congressionally-
ratified agreement with the occupant tribe in 1888.  The agreement established a permanent res-
ervation within the bounds of an earlier, and much larger, reservation that had been set aside by 
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executive orders and statutes to meet the subsistence needs of five tribes in Montana.  In Winters, 
the Court recognized that the earlier reservation had been set apart for the purpose of meeting the 
tribe’s then-existing “habits and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people.”  Id. at 576.  Ac-
cordingly, within that earlier reservation, the “Indians had command of the lands and the waters,-
-command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, ‘and grazing roving herds of 
stock,’ or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization.”  Id.  The Court did not suggest, how-
ever, that the Tribe’s command of water for purposes of hunting within the earlier reservation 
continued to apply to the reduced reservation created by the 1888 cession agreement.  Rather, the 
court looked solely to the purposes of the new agreement, which embodied “the desire of the 
tribe . . . to become a pastoral and civilized people.”  Id.   
The foundational principle established by Winters is that the primary purposes of the res-
ervation are established by looking forward, not backward, to what the parties anticipated would 
eventually be the Tribe’s permanent means of livelihood, as reflected in the Winters Court’s reli-
ance on the tribe’s “desire . . . to become a pastoral and civilized people.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
This same forward-looking analysis was employed in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 
(1963).  There, the Court recognized that, at the time the Indian reservations along the Colorado 
River were created, “water from the river would be essential to the life of the Indian people and 
to the animals they hunted and the crops they raised.”  Id. at 599.  While hunting provided sub-
sistence at the time of reservation, the Court did not imply reserved water rights for such activity, 
because it was clear that the United States understood that irrigated agriculture, not hunting, was 
to be the foundation of the tribes’ long-term livelihood.  R. 2230 (Arizona v. California Special 
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Master’s report concluding that the “United States intended to reserve mainstream water for the 
reasonable future needs of the … Indian Reservations . . . it was intended that the Indians would 
settle on the Reservation land and develop an agricultural economy”).  
Because reserved water rights are implied only by a tribe’s permanent needs, the Winters 
Court did not consider the purposes of the earlier reservation, which had been established to ad-
dress “the habits and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people.”  207 U.S. at 576.  Instead, the 
Court held that the Tribe’s need for water rights “as we view it, turns on the agreement of May, 
1888, resulting in creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation.”  Id. at 575.  The Tribe’s uses of wa-
ter on the earlier, larger, reservation, were irrelevant, because the carving out of a new, smaller 
reservation within the bounds of the old reservation was a “change in condition.”  Id.  In a case 
addressing another of the reservations created by the agreement that created the Fort Belknap 
Reservation, the Court held that the rights held by the tribe rested “entirely on the agreements or 
conventions [establishing a new reservation] which were ratified and given effect by Congress” 
because the executive orders establishing the earlier reservation were “designed to be temporary” 
and were “superseded by congressional action and no longer are of any force.”  British-American 
Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 163 (1936).   
Here, the district court based its holding solely on the purposes of the 1873 Executive Or-
der, R., 4320-22, and failed to examine the “change in condition” that occurred as a result of the 
1887 and 1889 Agreements.  Such examination reveals that the primary purpose of the reduced 
reservation was to fulfill the Tribe’s desire to establish a permanent livelihood based primarily 
on agriculture.   
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 21 
 
2.  The Executive Order of November 8, 1873 (R. 2031) was intended to set apart lands 
for the use of the Tribe pending congressional action upon the 1873 Agreement, which would 
have ceded the Tribe’s aboriginal lands and established a permanent reservation for the Tribe.  
The district court relied primarily on the 1873 Agreement to define the purposes of the Reserva-
tion, R. 4320-22, despite the fact that the Agreement, by its terms, was “null and void and of no 
effect” if not approved by Congress.  R. 1349.  Congress never ratified the 1873 Agreement.  In-
stead, fourteen years later, Congress ordered new negotiations with the Tribe for the cession of 
their lands outside the limits of the 1873 reservation.  Act of May 15, 1886, 24 Stat. 29, 44.  
Upon receiving the resulting agreement, which would have made the 1873 boundaries perma-
nent,2 Congress chose not to ratify the agreement, and instead directed the Department of the In-
terior “to negotiate with the Coeur d’Alene tribe of Indians for the purchase and release by said 
tribe of such portions of its reservation not agricultural and valuable chiefly for minerals and tim-
ber as such tribe shall consent to sell.”  Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980, 1002.  While not 
stated in the Act itself, the federal courts have determined that the intent of the 1889 Act “was to 
regain from the Tribe whatever submerged lands it was willing to sell.”  United States v. Idaho, 
210 F.3d at 1077 n.14.  The resulting agreement, in the words of the Supreme Court, “cede[d] the 
northern portion of the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene, 
                                                 
2 Absent congressional confirmation, a reservation established by executive order could be with-
drawn by the President at any time without compensation to the occupant tribe.  See Sioux Tribe of Indi-
ans v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 330 (1942) (“[i]t was a common practice during the period in which 
reservations were created by executive order for the President simply to terminate the existence of a reser-
vation by cancelling or revoking the order establishing it”). 
 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 22 
 
in exchange for $500,000.”  Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 269-70.   
Congress ratified the 1887 and 1889 Agreement together, in the 1891 Act, 26 Stat. at 
1028.  The plain language of the 1891 Act, when viewed in the context of the negotiations lead-
ing to the agreements approved therein, establishes that the primary purpose of the Act was to 
encourage the Tribe in its agricultural endeavors.  During the 1887 negotiations, Chief Seltice, 
who led negotiations for the Tribe, stated: 
We are on only a small part of our country—I mean this reservation.  Here we 
have made our homes; here we have built our houses; here we have our fences, 
our farms, our school-houses, our churches.  Here are our wives and our children; 
here are the graves of our ancestors; here are our hearts; here we have lived, and 
here we wish to die and be buried.  We want these preserved forever. 
R. 2157.  Seltice’s statement echoes a letter that Tribal leaders had penned several years earlier 
in response to a rumored petition by white settlers to open arable reservation lands to settlement 
and remove the Tribe to lands east of the St Joe River: 
Are we squirrels or the like animals, thus to drive us into a wilderness, where 
nothing can be raised to support people?  Or are we fishes, that we should be 
made to live in the water?  We say that we are men, as well as any whites are.  
From the land they would take away, we get our food, our clothing & whatever 
we are in need of.  For we till our land, raise crops, keep herds of cattle & thus 
provide for ourselves.   
R. 3399-3400.   
Given the Tribe’s repeated emphasis on protecting its farm lands, it is no surprise that 
protecting tribal farms was the focus of the 1889 negotiations.  Commissioner Benjamin Simp-
son opened negotiations by stating:  
The time is come when you, like the whites, should depend upon the cultivation 
of the soil.  You have progressed astonishingly.  When we look at your broad 
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acres now in cultivation we are astonished and gratified.  We know that the culti-
vation of the soil is the very foundation of civilization, prosperity, and wealth.   
R. 2114.  Later, Commissioner J. H. Shupe concluded negotiations by stating:   
When the conditions of these agreements are settled you will still have plenty of 
land left for farming and pasture, and the money that you will receive will enable 
you to improve your farms, and give you a community that will be far wealthier 
than your neighbors, the whites. 
R. 2119 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the negotiations centered on protecting the core of the 
Tribe’s farmlands.  The Tribe’s negotiators were hesitant to part with any land, but eventually 
expressed a willingness to relinquish lands on the northern part of the reservation that “have 
plenty of timber, plenty of mineral, and plenty of grass.”  R. 2115.   
 At no time during the negotiations did the Tribe express concern over loss of hunting or 
fishing grounds, nor did the parties discuss any need for protection of hunting and fishing rights.  
The parties did agree to tribal retention of the lower part of Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe 
River, but again the emphasis was on the area’s usefulness for agricultural purposes—General 
Simpson stated:  “Now if we buy this land you still have the St. Joseph River and the lower part 
of the lake and all the meadow and agricultural land along the St. Joe River.”  R. 2115. 
A reservation’s primary purposes are determined by identifying those uses of land that 
are actively encouraged by act, agreement, or order, rather than merely permitted.  The Wyoming 
Supreme Court, determining whether water rights for hunting were reserved by the treaty that 
created the Wind River Reservation, found that the “treaty encouraged only agriculture, and that 
was its primary purpose.”  In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big 
Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 97.  The treaty’s inclusion of an explicit hunting right was not 
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sufficient to deem hunting a primary purpose of the reservation, for hunting was permitted by the 
treaty’s terms, rather than encouraged.  Id.  “The fact that the Indians fully intended to continue 
to hunt and fish does not alter that conclusion,” nor did evidence of continued hunting and fish-
ing for many years after the treaty.  Id. at 97-98.   
Here, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements actively encourage the Tribe’s agricultural endeav-
ors, but lack any provisions encouraging the use of Reservation lands for hunting or fishing.  
Hunting and fishing rights were never mentioned or reserved, only implied by the provision 
promising to hold the Reservation “forever as Indian land.”  26 Stat. at 1028.  See Menominee 
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968) (“the language ‘to be held as Indian 
lands are held’ includes the right to fish and to hunt”).  But nothing in the Agreements or in the 
negotiations encourages hunting and fishing as a primary use of Reservation lands or as a perma-
nent means of livelihood: the Tribe’s own negotiators emphasized that their primary purpose was 
to protect their farms, supra p. 23 and R. 2157 (statement of Chief Seltice) and Congress ex-
pressly intended to support such purpose by providing funds and resources to “promote the pro-
gress, comfort, improvements, education, and civilization of said Coeur d’Alene Indians.”  26 
Stat. at 1028, 1031.  Because the primary purpose of encouraging agriculture is explicit on the 
face of the Agreements, the Court need not, and should not, supply a casus omissus by implying 
a primary purpose that the parties themselves failed to express.    
D. Instream Flows Cannot be Awarded on Waterways Within those Portions of the 
Reservation No Longer Reserved for the Tribe’s Exclusive Use and Benefit. 
Even if the district court were correct to conclude that the primary purposes of the 1891 
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Act did not supersede the purposes of the 1873 Executive Order, it still erred in finding the Tribe 
entitled to instream flows on all Reservation streams without addressing whether water rights for 
hunting and fishing survived the alienation in 1906 of over three quarters of the Reservation.  
The court’s omission is especially puzzling in light of the court’s later acknowledgment, in 
granting a motion to reconsider the proper priority date for springs and wetlands on lands reac-
quired by the Tribe, that “to the extent [reserved water] rights are non-diversionary or are for in-
stream purposes, such rights would be lost through non-use” once reservation lands were con-
veyed to non-Indians, so that, upon reacquisition by the Tribe, the reserved water right would 
“carry a date of reacquisition priority date.”  R. 4474.  The Court’s holding is based, correctly, on 
the premise that non-diversionary rights do not survive on reservation lands sold in fee to non-
Indians, and thus must acquire a new priority date when the lands are again taken into trust by 
the United States.  The necessary corollary of such premise is that the United States cannot claim 
non-diversionary reserved water rights to protect fish and wildlife habitat on lands not currently 
held in trust for the Tribe.  Indeed, the United States’ claims embody this premise by decrying 
any intent to claim water rights for wildlife habitat on private lands.  R. 0011 (“[t]his claim is for 
a sufficient amount of water to maintain wetlands, springs, and seeps on Tribal lands within the 
Reservation”) (emphasis added).  This same premise applies as equally to fish habitat as it does 
to wildlife habitat, and the district court erred by not disallowing instream flow claims to protect 
fish habitat on alienated Reservation lands. 
1.  The reservation of lands for a tribe’s exclusive use and occupation may imply the res-
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ervation of certain ancillary rights necessary to fulfill the Tribe’s purposes and needs.  Rights im-
plied from the setting aside of lands for a tribe’s exclusive use may include hunting and fishing 
rights, Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 406, and, in certain circumstances, water rights 
necessary to support hunting and fishing.  United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 
1983).  But, in such instances, the foundation upon which implied water rights are grounded is a 
reservation both of title and beneficial use in the land itself for the communal use of the tribe: 
“[a] reserved water right must be based on a reservation of land.”  United States v. City of Chal-
lis, 133 Idaho 525, 529, 988 P.2d 1199, 1203 (1999).   
The history of Indian reservations, and the Coeur d’Alene Reservation in particular, is 
that property rights initially reserved for a tribe’s communal use did not always survive subse-
quent congressional actions that opened reservation lands to non-Indian settlement.  For such 
reason, the determination of whether a tribe is entitled to reserved water rights cannot stop with 
the federal action initially setting aside the reservation.   
Land within reservations was originally held as “Indian land,” or communal property.  
“Tribal lands are communal property . . . .”  Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 
F.2d 906, 913 (Ct. Cl. 1963).  “Such communal holding of property is in accord with normal In-
dian custom.  Land is so held whether by Indian title or after creation of a reservation.”  White-
foot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658, 661 (Ct. Cl. 1961).  Communal property was often held for 
the purpose of preserving hunting and fishing opportunities.  See Montana Power v. Rochester¸ 
127 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1942) (“[t]he Indian society is communal in character rather than in-
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dividualistic; that is particularly true of the hunting and fishing grounds of the Indians”).  Com-
munal property rights ceased, however, when the reservation was allotted, with each tribal mem-
ber being assigned a parcel of land for their individual use:  
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, large sections of the western States and 
Territories were set aside for Indian reservations.  Towards the end of the century, 
however, Congress increasingly adhered to the view that the Indians tribes should 
abandon their nomadic lives on the communal reservations and settle into an 
agrarian economy on privately-owned parcels of land.  This shift was fueled in 
part by the belief that individualized farming would speed the Indians' assimila-
tion into American society and in part by the continuing demand for new lands for 
the waves of homesteaders moving West.  As a result of these combined pres-
sures, Congress passed a series of surplus land acts at the turn of the century to 
force Indians onto individual allotments carved out of reservations and to open up 
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement.   
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1984); see also Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 
1072, 1077, 194 L. Ed. 2d 152 (2016) (allotment was a “means of encouraging [tribal members] 
to depart from the communal lifestyle of the reservation”); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706 
(1987) (allotment acts “divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allot-
ments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement”).  
Congress ordered allotment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation in the Act of June 21, 
1906, with each tribal member receiving a trust patent to 160 acres.  34 Stat. at 335.  By law, 
such patents were held in trust for the “sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment 
shall have been made . . . .”  General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 348).  In other words, once allotted, lands are held for the individual benefit of the allot-
tees, not the communal benefit of the Tribe.  Arenas v. United States, 322 U.S. 419, 420–21 
(1944) (“communal land holdings of the Indians were superseded by allotment to individuals”).  
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Allotment also affects water rights: upon allotment, “‘the right to use some portion of tribal wa-
ters essential to cultivation passed to the owners.’”  Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 
F.2d 42, 50 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532 (1939)). 
In conjunction with allotment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, Congress made all unal-
lotted or “surplus” lands available for sale to non-Indians.  Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. at 336.  
Even more so than allotment, the sale of surplus lands had a profound impact on communal 
rights implied from the previous reservation of the lands for the tribe’s exclusive use.  It is gener-
ally acknowledged that the United States, in opening reservation lands to non-Indian purchasers, 
sought to extinguish tribal possessory rights “so that, as their trustee, it could make perfect title 
to purchasers.”  Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1920).  Thus, upon sale 
of reservation land to non-Indians, the tribe “loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use 
and occupation of the conveyed lands.”  South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993).  
Any rights implied from the setting aside of lands for the Tribe’s communal use are likewise lost.  
This includes water rights: “a homesteader acquires no federal water rights incident to the trans-
fer of public lands into private ownership [once land] is conveyed to a homesteader, the purposes 
for which Winters rights were implied are eliminated.”  United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d. 
1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1984). 
2.  Because reserved water rights are implied from the United States’ reservation of land 
for a tribe’s exclusive benefit, it is axiomatic that such rights are implied only so long as the 
United States retains the lands for the purpose that is the basis for implying the water right.  That 
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being the case, implied water rights survive the sale of surplus lands only if the United States ei-
ther: (1) acts to explicitly retain water rights on the alienated land; or (2) in rare cases, holds suf-
ficient property back from the alienation to imply the reservation of the right to control uses of 
the alienated lands as necessary for the use and enjoyment of the retained property.  
“The government, as the owner of land, may attach any condition it sees fit upon parting 
with its title; or it may grant a qualified and limited estate and reserve the right to control the 
property . . . .”  State v. Lott, 21 Idaho 646, 123 P. 491, 496 (1912).  There is nothing in the 1906 
Act, however, that indicates congressional intent to retain hunting and fishing rights, or any tribal 
property rights whatsoever, in homesteaded lands.  The Secretary of the Interior was directed to 
“sell or dispose of unallotted lands” without qualification.  Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. at 335.  
Lands were classified as agricultural, grazing, or timber lands, then sold to homesteaders “at not 
less than their appraised value.”  Id. at 336.  The “net proceeds arising from the sale and disposi-
tion of the land” were to be expended for the Tribe’s benefit or “paid to the Indians in cash per 
capita.”  Id. at 337.  In short, Congress directed that the Tribe’s property rights in opened lands 
would be conveyed in return for payment to the Tribe of the full appraised value of the lands.  
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903) (court may not question validity of con-
veyance of tribal property where Congress “purported to give an adequate consideration for the 
surplus lands not allotted among the Indians or reserved for their benefit”).  No property rights 
were held back from the conveyance.  “When the patent issued, the full legal title passed to the 
patentee.  He could do with the land that which he saw fit, sell, or give it away.”  Hartman v. 
Butterfield Lumber Co., 199 U.S. 335, 336 (1905); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 30 
 
1981) (“[w]e have also held that a patent pursuant to the homestead laws conveys all incidents of 
title free from any implied easement”); Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 
698 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (Tribe’s “permanent possession and use of the surplus, unallotted, and unre-
served reservation lands terminated when the homesteader actually entered and settled upon the 
tract chosen by him”). 
Moreover, Congress did not merely open lands within the Reservation to non-Indian 
ownership: it required that the new owners settle the lands “under the provisions of the home-
stead laws.”  1906 Act, 34 Stat. at 336.  This is particularly relevant because the homestead laws 
required settlers to cultivate the land and provide proof of such cultivation.  Homestead Act of 
May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 392, 393.  The Tribe’s claims that Congress intended to preserve fish 
habitat on opened lands for the Tribe’s benefit cannot be reconciled with Congress’ imposition of 
an affirmative duty upon buyers to settle and cultivate the land. 
3.  The 1906 Act’s lack of explicit intent to hold back communal water rights for fish 
habitat from alienation is fatal to the Tribe’s claims, for property rights on alienated lands do not 
exist by implication except in the rarest of circumstances.  The Supreme Court has held repeat-
edly that if lands reserved for a tribe’s exclusive use are alienated to nonmembers, all rights im-
plied from the previous setting aside of land for the tribe’s use are either conveyed to the non-
member purchasers or cease to apply.  The benchmark decision is Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544 (1981), which addressed the authority of the Crow Tribe to protect fish and wildlife re-
sources on its reservation. Such authority over fish and wildlife was implied from the setting 
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aside of lands for the Tribe’s “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.”  Id. at 558-59.  Af-
ter allotment of its reservation, and sale of a substantial number of allotments to nonmembers, 
the Tribe asserted that it retained the right to prevent hunting by nonmembers on the alienated 
allotments.  While the Court acknowledged that the nonmember lands remained part of the reser-
vation, the Court held that “treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of 
the subsequent alienation of those lands.”  Id. at 561.   
A consequence of alienation was that the Tribe lost the property owner’s right to exclude 
others, and the lesser-included right to protect wildlife resources by prohibiting hunting, because 
such right “could only extend to land on which the Tribe exercises ‘absolute and undisturbed use 
and occupation.’”  Id. at 559 (quoting Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649 (1868)); see also Nevada 
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (holding that Montana “rejected tribal authority to regulate 
nonmembers' activities on land over which the tribe could not ‘assert a landowner's right to oc-
cupy and exclude’”).  
In short, Montana stands for the common-sense proposition that the United States’ un-
qualified alienation of Reservation lands includes all property rights the Tribe formerly held as 
the landowner, whether express or implied, unless such rights were reserved explicitly in the act 
authorizing such alienation, or, in rarer cases, the reservation of right can be implied unambigu-
ously from the circumstances surrounding alienation.   
Montana does not stand alone.  Its core principle that rights implied by the reservation of 
lands are lost when land is alienated has been repeatedly applied by the Supreme Court.  One 
case especially on point is Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of Wash., 433 
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U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III), which was cited in Montana.  There, the Court was asked to de-
termine whether a fishing right implied from the reservation of riverside lands for a tribe’s exclu-
sive use continued to apply despite the alienation of all but 22 acres within the original 18,000 
acre reservation.  The Tribe asserted that the treaty setting aside the lands for the tribe’s exclu-
sive use “amount[ed] to a reservation of the right to fish free of state interference.”  Id. at 174.  
The Court concluded, however, that “such an interpretation clashes with the subsequent history 
of the reservation.”  Id.3  Thus, the Tribe’s fishing on alienated lands was “subject to reasonable 
regulation by the state pursuant to its power to conserve an important natural resource.”  Id. at 
175.  The Court’s conclusion that preservation of fish and game on alienated reservation lands is 
a matter subject to state, not tribal, authority, is as applicable to instream flows for fish habitat as 
it is to the fish themselves. 
Another case addressing tribal authority to preserve natural resources on nonmember fee 
lands is Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 
(1989).  The Yakima Reservation consisted of two distinct areas: a “closed” area wherein ap-
proximately 97 percent of the lands were retained by the Tribe, and an “open” area wherein ap-
proximately half the lands were owned by nonmembers.  Id. at 415-16.  The Tribe sought to reg-
ulate use of lands by nonmembers to preserve natural resources and wildlife habitat in the closed 
area, and agricultural lands in the open area.  Id. at 438.  The Tribe asserted the right to control 
                                                 
3  The Tribe lost the exclusive right to fish implied from the since-abrogated setting aside of lands 
for the Tribe’s sole use, but retained the non-exclusive right to enter the alienated lands and fish under a 
treaty provision allowing the tribe to fish at usual and accustomed place in common with non-Indians,  
Puyallup III, 433 U.S. at 174.  The agreements with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe lack any such provision.    
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use of all reservation lands based on a treaty provision setting aside the reservation “for the ex-
clusive use and benefit” of the Tribe.  Justice White, writing for a plurality, stated:  “We disa-
gree.  The Yakima Nation no longer retains the ‘exclusive use and benefit’ of all the land within 
the reservation boundaries established by the Treaty with the Yakimas.”  Id. at 422 (citing 
Puyallup III and Montana).   
Justice White’s plurality opinion in Brendale would have flatly rejected any tribal control 
over uses of nonmember lands to preserve resources of interest to the tribe.  Id. at 425.  Justice 
Stevens, in a concurring opinion which controlled the outcome of the case, likewise concluded 
that it was “improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regu-
lating the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in setting 
tribal policy.”  Id. at 437.  Stevens thus joined the plurality in rejecting tribal control of land use 
on the “open” portion of the reservation, where about half the lands were owned by nonmem-
bers.  Stevens, however, held that in the “closed” part of the reservation, where 97 percent of the 
lands were held for the Tribe’s use, it was “inconceivable that Congress would have intended 
that the sale of a few lots would divest the Tribe of the power to determine the character of the 
tribal community.”  Id. at 437.  In such extraordinary circumstances Steven’s concurring opinion 
recognized tribal authority to require preservation of natural resources on nonmember fee lands.   
In subsequent cases, the Court has characterized the Brendale holdings as “turn[ing] on 
the extent to which the Tribes maintained ownership and control over the areas in which the par-
cels were located.”  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 390 (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 438-44 (opin-
ion of Stevens, J.)).  Likewise, the Court has emphasized that the lack of tribal rights to restrict 
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the use of nonmember lands is the norm, given that the Brendale decision merely authorized 
tribal zoning “on nonmember fee land isolated in ‘the heart of a closed portion of the reserva-
tion’. . . .” Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 333-34 
(2008) (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 440 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (internal alteration omitted)). 
A final case addressing the loss of rights on alienated reservation lands is Blake v. Arnett, 
663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981), which addressed the fishing rights of the Yurok Indians on the Kla-
math Indian Reservation, which was established by an executive order that specifically encom-
passed the Yurok’s fishing grounds along a 20 mile stretch of the Klamath River.  Id. at 911.  
Several decades after its establishment, the Reservation was allotted, and surplus lands were 
opened to homesteading.  Id. at 908.  A timber company that had purchased a number of former 
allotments challenged the right of the Yurok Indians to enter its lands to hunt and fish.  The court 
acknowledged that “when the Reservation was first created,” hunting and fishing were “not 
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”  Id. at 
909 (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).   
Despite such fact, the court held that “any interest in the land that might be implied from 
the mere creation of the reservation,” including implied fishing rights, did not survive alienation 
of the lands to non-Indians.  Id. at 911.  The United States’ grant of fee title to allotments granted 
the allottee and any non-Indian successors title “in fee . . . and free of all charge and incum-
brance whatsoever.”  Id. at 910 (quoting General Allotment Act, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389).  In light 
of such language, the court concluded that no tribal property rights, including an “equitable ser-
vitude that benefits the tribe and burdens the land,” could encumber allotted lands.  Id.  The court 
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF--DOCKET NO. 45381-2017 Page 35 
 
held that the same was true for lands opened to homesteading: “a patent pursuant to the home-
stead laws conveys all incidents of title free from any implied easement.”  Id. at 911.   
Importantly, the Blake decision distinguished the holding in United States v. Winans, 
which held that a treaty provision guaranteeing the signatory tribes the right to fish at “usual and 
accustomed places” imposed a servitude upon such fishing places that continued to apply after 
the property was patented to non-Indian settlers.  198 U.S. at 381.  The Blake court held that 
even though the Klamath Reservation was undoubtedly created to provide access to the Yurok 
Tribe’s traditional fishing places, it could not imply a servitude similar to that in Winans because 
“we find no such express reservation or creation of fishing or hunting right” in the documents 
that created the reservation.  663 F.2d at 911. 
The rationales of Puyallup III, Montana, Brendale and Blake are particularly applicable 
to instream flow claims, which “entitlement consists of the right to prevent other appropriators 
from depleting the streams waters below a protected level.”  United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 
1394, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983).  Such a water right, whether deemed a property right, a servitude, or 
a regulatory right to restrict water use and maintain natural conditions, does not survive the un-
qualified alienation of reservation lands, particularly where (as here) non-Indian fee land hold-
ings are substantial.  See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689 (when a tribe’s lands are conveyed in fee “to 
non-Indians, it loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the con-
veyed lands,” including the right to prevent taking of fish and game).  If a tribe lacks the right to 
hunt and fish on alienated land, and lacks the right to prevent the direct taking of fish and game 
by the non-Indian owners, it is axiomatic that it likewise lacks the right to prevent those same 
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owners from taking fish or game through depletion of instream fish habitat.   
The application of these principles is particularly apt on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  
According to the Tribe’s map of Tribal Lands at Claim Locations and Adjacent to Reservation 
Streams (filed under seal), the overwhelming majority of land within the twelve on-reservation 
stream basins that drain into Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe River are privately-held fee 
lands.4  The fee owners possess absolute, unqualified title to such lands—Congress did not ex-
plicitly reserve a servitude or other property right allowing the Tribe to assert ownership and 
control over streams flowing over or through private lands, and there is insufficient tribal owner-
ship of the streambeds and surrounding lands to imply intent to retain tribal control of stream 
flows.   
3.  There are three decisions by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that recognize re-
served water rights for instream flows within Indian reservations despite non-Indian fee owner-
ship of some lands along the claimed streams.  The three Ninth Circuit cases are United States v. 
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th 
Cir. 1981); and United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).  As discussed below, 
                                                 
4  The twelve claims dominated by private fee lands are: 92-10906 (Cherry Creek), 92-10907 (Al-
der Creek), 94-9244 (Black Creek), 94-9425 (Willow Creek), 94-9246 (Evans Creek), 95-16678 (Fighting 
Creek), 95-16679 (Lake Creek), 95-16680 (Plummer Creek), 95-16681 (Little Plummer Creek), 95-16682 
(Pedee Creek), 95-16683 (Benewah Creek), and 95-16684 (Windfall Creek).  Compare R. 4479 (Order 
on Motion to Set Aside and Modify) with R. 3692 (Protective Order & map filed under seal).  Because the 
tribe owns the beds and banks of the St. Joe River, the State does not contend that alienation of reserva-
tion lands affected instream flow rights in the St. Joe River (91-7777), if the Court concludes preservation 
of fish and game habitat was a purpose of the Reservation.  Two other claims for Hangman Creek (93-
7469 and 93-7470) may require additional fact-finding to determine if such claims meet the high thresh-
old established in Brendale for implying intent to reserve control over uses of land (and, presumably, in-
stream fish habitat) by non-Indian landowners.   
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the result in each instance is consistent with the holdings in Puyallup III, Montana, Brendale and 
Blake, and factually distinguished from the situation presented on the opened Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation. 
Adair:  In Adair, the court addressed the unique situation of the Klamath Indian Reserva-
tion, which was “terminated” in accordance with a since-abandoned policy adopted by Congress 
in the 1950s that sought to end the trust relationship between the United States and Indians.  The 
Klamath Reservation had been allotted in the early 20th century, but at the time of termination 
75% of the original reservation remained held in trust for the Tribe and its members.  723 F.2d at 
1398.  As part of termination, the United States purchased or condemned the remaining trust 
lands, and retained most of them for use as a national forest and wildlife refuge.  As a result, 
70% of the former reservation remained in federal ownership after termination.  Id. 
The Klamath Reservation had originally been reserved in 1864, and one of the “‘very 
purposes’ of establishing the Klamath Reservation was to secure to the Tribe a continuation of its 
traditional hunting and fishing lifestyle.”  Id. at 1409.  Thus, the court implied intent to “reserve 
a quantity of the water flowing through the reservation . . . for the purpose of maintaining the 
Tribe's treaty right to hunt and fish on reservation lands.”  Id. at 1410.  The water right was non-
consumptive, so that it “consist[ed] of the right to prevent other appropriators from depleting the 
streams waters below a protected level in any area where the non-consumptive right applies.”  Id. 
at 1411.  
The non-Indian owners within the Reservation argued, much as the State does here, that 
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“the Tribe can no longer hold a water right to support its treaty hunting and fishing rights be-
cause the Tribe no longer owns land to which this water right is appurtenant.”  Id. at 1415 n. 24.  
Such argument failed, however, in light of two statutory provisions unique to the Klamath Ter-
mination Act and its related legislation. 
The first provision, 25 U.S.C. § 564m(b), expressly retained within the terminated reser-
vation those fishing rights reserved to the Tribe by treaty.  The court relied on an earlier decision, 
Kimball v. Callahan, in which the court had held that the treaty provision reserving the “exclu-
sive right” to fish within the Reservation, in combination with the “Klamath Termination Act 
[which] expressly provided that nothing in the Act would abrogate the fishing rights secured by 
the Treaty,” were sufficient to “protect the exercise of those treaty rights on the lands constitut-
ing the ancestral Klamath Indian Reservation.”  Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 774 (9th Cir. 
1979).  The court in Kimball distinguished the Klamath Tribe’s expressly-reserved fishing rights 
from the implied fishing rights lost upon alienation of allotted lands in Puyallup III, with the ca-
veat that the “transfer of reservation lands . . . may affect treaty rights by converting the exercise 
of those rights from exclusive to non-exclusive.”  Id. 
The second provision cited by the Adair court was Section 564m(a) of the Termination 
Act, which provided “[n]othing in sections 564–564w of this title shall abrogate any water rights 
of the tribe and its members.”  Id. at 1412 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 564m(a)).  As the court noted 
“[t]his provision admits no exception.”  Id.  This led the court to conclude that “[b]ecause Con-
gress in section 564m of the Termination Act explicitly protected tribal water rights and nowhere 
in the Act explicitly denied them, we can only conclude that such rights survived termination.”  
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Id. at 1412. 
In short, Adair establishes only the unremarkable proposition that where the United 
States retains ownership of 70% of former reservation lands, and Congress explicitly reserves the 
Tribe’s fishing rights and water rights on former reservation lands, whether or not in private 
ownership, instream flows implied from the original setting aside of the lands for the Tribe’s ex-
clusive use continue to apply to streams and rivers within the former reservation.  Adair finds no 
application to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, which, unlike the former Klamath Reservation, is 
mostly owned in fee simple by non-Indians, with little or no retained federal lands within its 
boundaries.  More importantly, unlike the Klamath Termination Act, Congress did not act to pre-
serve fishing and water rights in the 1906 Act that opened the Reservation to homesteading.  34 
Stat. at 335-38. 
Walton:  In Walton, the court addressed another unique situation involving a tribal in-
stream flow claim to a small, on-reservation waterway named, appropriately, No Name Creek.  
The creek ran through a row of seven allotments.  Four allotments were owned by the Tribe or 
leased by the Tribe from the allottees.  647 F.2d at 45.  The court assumed that “none of the 
Tribe’s allotments ever passed from Indian ownership.”  Id. at 45 n.5.  The middle three allot-
ments were held by Walton, a non-Indian.  Id. at 45.  The creek emptied into Omak Lake, in 
which the Tribe had established a non-native fishery to replace fish lost due to the damming of 
the Columbia River, which bordered the Colville Reservation.  Id. at 48.  The non-native fish 
“thrive[d] in the lake’s saline water, but need[ed] fresh water to spawn.”  Id. at 45. “The Indians 
cultivated No Name Creek’s lower reach [that ran through three tribal allotments] to establish 
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spawning grounds but irrigation use depleted the water flow during spawning season.”  Id.  
The court held that the Tribes “have a reserved right to the quantity of water necessary to 
maintain the Omak Lake Fishery [including] the right to sufficient water to permit natural 
spawning of the trout.”  Id.  Because the trout spawned only in the lower reach of the creek, 
which ran through three tribal allotments, the Walton decision establishes only that when tribal 
allotments form the majority of lands in an isolated stream basin, the Tribe may be entitled to an 
instream flow water right to support fish spawning on those portions of the creek running 
through tribal lands.  In short, because the spawning grounds remained under federal ownership 
in trust for the Tribes and had never been alienated, reserved water rights for those lands contin-
ued to apply.  
Walton has no application to the present claims for instream flows on streams running en-
tirely, or nearly so, through private fee lands.  Unlike the Omak Lake fishery at issue in Walton, 
the Tribe has not shown that it owns or controls the majority of the stream beds, with the excep-
tion of the St. Joe River (decreed to the Tribe in U.S. v. Idaho), and possibly portions of Hang-
man Creek.  Absent such a showing, the Court must decline any invitation to employ Walton as 
precedent for the Tribe’s claims.   
Anderson:  In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit addressed another unique set of circumstances 
that led it to conclude that the tribe had an instream water right to support a tribal fishery.  The 
fishery was in Chamokane Creek, which formed the eastern boundary of the Spokane Indian 
Reservation.  736 F.2d at 1366.  The reservation boundary did not go down the middle of the 
Creek.  Rather, the boundary was drawn along the east bank of the Creek in order to reserve the 
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breadth of the creek for the Tribe’s use.  Ex. Order of Jan. 18, 1881, 1 Charles J. Kappler, Indian 
Affairs: Laws and Treaties 925 (1904).  Given these unique circumstances, the district court con-
cluded that “maintenance of the creek for fishing was a purpose for creating the Reservation.”  
United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D. Wash. 1982).  
The Spokane reservation was later allotted and opened to homesteading.  Anderson, 736 
F.2d at 1361.  None of the parties in the case, however, asserted that the allotment and opening 
of the Reservation had affected the Tribe’s right to enter or fish on Chamokane Creek.  Rather, 
the district court recognized that the Tribe had a continuing right of “access to fishing areas” 
along the Creek and thus a “reserved right to sufficient water to preserve fishing in the 
Chamokane Creek.”  Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5.  The court’s holding must be understood in the 
context of its unstated assumption that the Tribe retained either the bed of Chamokane Creek or 
sufficient uplands along the Creek such that opening of the reservation did not affect the Tribe’s 
fishing rights in the Creek; indeed, the court noted that the Spokane Tribe had reacquired “much” 
of the former allotments and homesteaded lands in the Chamokane Creek basin.  736 F.2d at 
1361.  Tribal ownership is also demonstrated by the district court’s award of water to the Tribe 
for irrigation purposes for lands in the Chamokane Creek basin.  Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 7.   
In short, Anderson is based on the assumption, unchallenged by any party, that the Tribe 
held sufficient property so in and along Chamokane Creek so as to provide it control over the 
fishery in the Creek.  Thus, the court did not address the issue presented here, i.e., whether hunt-
ing and fishing rights, and associated water rights, survive on non-navigable waterways in stream 
basins that are owned entirely, or nearly so, by non-Indians due to the opening of the Reservation 
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to homesteading.   
A decision does not establish controlling precedent if the court did not “consider[] the 
question” because the issue was uncontested by the parties.  State v. Cutler, 109 Idaho 448, 451, 
708 P.2d 853, 856 (1985); see also Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“[q]uestions 
which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are 
not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents”).  Thus, Anderson 
does not establish, as a general proposition, that water rights for hunting and fishing survive the 
alienation of the streams that such rights are supposed to preserve.  Even if Anderson were 
viewed as precedent for establishing instream flow water rights on streams with a mix of private 
and tribal lands, it still could not be reliably applied to the present claims, because there are in-
sufficient facts to establish a mix of private and tribal lands comparable to the situation presented 
in Anderson.   
Indeed, the only fact that can be gleaned from Anderson is that the Tribe had a sufficient 
property interest in Chamokane Creek to allow it fishing access.  Here, the Tribe and the United 
States have not asserted a right of fishing access on all the claimed streams; rather, they have 
simply argued that it does not matter whether the Tribe has fishing access or not.  R. 3553 (U.S. 
Response Brief) (“[t]he instream flow water right claims on behalf of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe do 
not rely on rights to fish on private lands”); R. 3149 (Tribe Response Brief) (“[t]he Tribe does 
not claim in this adjudication the right to enter on to non-Indian fee lands for any purpose related 
to these non-consumptive instream flow water rights”).  Anderson simply does not support the 
assertion that a tribe is entitled to a reservation of instream flow water rights regardless of 
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whether the tribe has to right to access the stream to conduct a fishery.   
d.  In sum, in allotting the Coeur d’Alene Reservation and selling its surplus lands, Con-
gress did not specifically reserve hunting, fishing, and water rights, as it did when terminating 
the Klamath Reservation.  Nor did the Tribe retain sufficient lands in and along the streams on 
the opened portion of the Reservation to preserve fishing rights and provide it control of spawn-
ing and rearing habitat, as was the case in Walton, and presumably, Anderson.  If anything, the 
opened portions of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation are most akin to Puyallup III and Blake, 
where the courts held that rights implied from the setting aside of lands for a tribe’s exclusive 
use did not survive the alienation of those same lands.  If implied fishing rights fundamental to a 
tribe’s survival do not survive alienation of lands, the same must necessarily hold true for im-
plied water rights.  Once Congress has determined that land no longer need be held to provide for 
a tribe’s hunting and fishing needs, the same determination applies to water rights to preserve 
fish and wildlife habitat on those same lands.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the district court with an or-
der to disallow all claims for reserved water rights for hunting and fishing purposes, including 
reserved water rights to maintain instream flows, water rights to maintain springs and seeps, wa-
ter rights to maintain wetlands, and a water right for a portion of Coeur d’Alene Lake for hunting 
and fishing purposes.  In the event this Court denies such relief, the State requests, alternatively, 
that this case be remanded to the district court with an order to disallow all instream flows on 
those non-navigable streams within the Reservation that flow entirely, or primarily, through non-
Indian fee lands, 5 and with an order to engage in fact-finding to determine whether the United 
States holds sufficient land along Hangman Creek in trust for the Tribe to imply intent to retain 
control of the two claimed minimum stream flows on Hangman Creek. 6
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